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Abstract
The best justification of time-discounting is roughly that it is rational to care less about your more distant future because 
there is less of you around to have it. I argue that the standard version of this argument, which treats both psychological 
continuity and psychological connectedness as reasons to care about your future, can only rationalize an irrational—because 
exploitable—form of future discounting.
Keywords Decision theory · Future discounting · Personal identity
Positive time-preference is a bias towards the present or near 
future at the expense of the more distant future. Most people 
exhibit at least positive time-preference for fixed monetary 
sums. For instance, you would prefer $100 now to $100 in 
a year’s time.1
There are three natural justifications for this. The first is 
that the nominal interest rate is positive. This means that you 
could simply invest the $100 now for a return of more than 
$100 in a year’s time. So you are strictly better off taking 
the $100 now.
The second is the declining marginal utility of money. 
Every extra dollar matters less to you than the last—this 
is why rich people spend money on luxuries like taxi-rides 
that many poorer people could also afford but choose not to 
purchase. If you expect that your wealth will increase over 
time, an extra $100 is going to be worth less to you in a 
year’s time than it is now.
The third justification involves uncertainty. Many things 
other than an increase in wealth could happen over the next 
year that would also make $100 less valuable to you at the 
end of that period. For instance, you might die; or the mon-
etary authority might impose currency controls. Factoring 
this uncertainty into your present decision may suppress the 
value of the future $100 relative to the present $100.
Distinguish monetary positive time-preference from pure 
positive time-preference, by which I mean time-preference 
for utility or well-being under conditions of certainty. For 
instance, suppose that you are offered a choice between two 
goods (sums of money, episodes of consumption etc.) at an 
early and a late time respectively; and that you are certain 
that the late good will be just as valuable to you when you 
get it as the early good when you get it. (So you are certain 
that you will not die over the period, or at least that death 
will not affect the good’s contribution to your welfare.) If 
you still prefer the early good then you are exhibiting pure 
time-preference.
None of the three suggested justifications for monetary 
time-preference could justify pure time-preference. Well-
being unlike money cannot be invested for a future return, 
so positive interest rates cannot justify it. Every additional 
unit of well-being is by definition as valuable as the last, so 
an expected secular increase in well-being cannot justify it. 
And you are by hypothesis as certain to enjoy the late good 
if you choose it now as to enjoy the early good if you choose 
it now. So uncertainty about the future cannot justify pure 
time-preference either. Can anything justify it?
Many writers have thought not. For instance, Plato 
thought that discounting the future in this way involves 
a confusion something like that between what is small 
and what is far away.2 Hume and Pigou have also traced 
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time-preference to some (possibly similar) deficiency in our 
ways of thinking about the future.3
My target in this paper is one argument for pure positive 
time-preference that seems to have a chance of working. 
This is Parfit’s argument based on personal identity, or rather 
on what he thinks matters about personal identity. In brief, 
his view is that what gives me special reason for concern 
about my future is the degree of psychological connection 
between me now and me then. Since this degree subsides, I 
am rational to care less about my more distant future.4
I argue that this rationale for time-preference faces a 
severe pragmatic difficulty that does not seem to have been 
noticed. Given plausible assumptions about the rate at which 
connections attenuate, anyone who rationalizes her concern 
for future well-being on Parfitian grounds is exploitable: 
that is, will voluntarily take a course of action that not only 
reduces her overall well-being but strictly reduces it at some 
time without increasing it at any. So Parfit’s considerations 
could only rationalize a form of time-preference that is in 
this sense inefficient; and this is at least grounds for regard-
ing the latter as irrational.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines 
Parfit’s position. Section 2 describes and illustrates the argu-
ment that exploitation threatens time-preference unless it 
takes one specific form. Section 3 argues that the Parfitian 
argument rationalizes a form of time-preference that does 
not take this form and which therefore is arguably irrational. 
Section 4 considers some objections.
1  Parfitian Time‑Preference
Parfit writes:
My concern for my future may correspond to the 
degree of connectedness between me now and myself 
in the future. Connectedness is one of the two relations 
that give me reasons to be specially concerned about 
my own future [, the other being continuity5]. It can 
be rational to care less, when one of the grounds for 
caring will hold to a lesser degree. Since connected-
ness is nearly always weaker over longer periods, I can 
rationally care less about my further future.6
By connectedness Parfit means a relation that holds with 
more or less strength between myself at one time and myself 
at another. The degree of connectedness corresponds to the 
number of direct connections, of the right kind, between 
those mental states and events (memories, character traits, 
experiences, thoughts) of mine that obtain or occur at the 
earlier and those that obtain or occur at the later time.
For instance, if I see a red car on Tuesday morning and—
via the normal mechanism—recall seeing it on Tuesday 
afternoon, then the causal link between my visual experience 
on Tuesday morning and the episode of conscious recollec-
tion on Tuesday afternoon constitutes one such connection 
‘of the right kind’ between myself on Tuesday morning and 
myself on Tuesday afternoon.
Connection can involve identity as well as causation. If 
on Tuesday morning I form the belief that Jones drives a 
red car, and if I preserve this belief until Tuesday afternoon, 
again via whatever mechanism is normal for me, then the 
preservation of this state by itself constitutes another con-
nection ‘of the right kind’ between myself on Tuesday morn-
ing and myself on Tuesday afternoon.7
I won’t—because Parfit doesn’t—attempt to give a sharp 
criterion for exactly which connections are ‘of the right 
kind’. But I will assume, because he assumes, that we have 
some way to count them.
Now define strong connectedness as the holding of very 
many such connections between a person at one time and 
a person at another. At one point Parfit suggests that ‘very 
many’ requires the holding of at least half of the number of 
connections that hold across any ordinary day-long period 
in the life of nearly every actual person.8 Clearly strong con-
nectedness need not be transitive: although it holds between 
me on any day and me on the following day, it probably does 
not hold between me now and me in very many years’ time.
Finally, we can say that a person A1 at time t1 and person 
An at the later time tn (written t1 < tn) are continuous if and 
only if there is a chain of persons-at-times, A2-at-t2, A3-at-
t3… An−1-at-tn−1, with t1 < t2 <⋯tn−1 < tn, such that each is 
strongly connected to the next, A1-at-t1 is strongly connected 
to A2-at-t2 and An−1-at-tn−1 is strongly connected to An-at-tn. 
4 For a brief account of other normative arguments in this direction 
see Frederick at al. (2002), p.  359. The authors of this paper there 
describe Parfit’s argument as ‘the most compelling argument support-
ing the logic of positive time-preference’.
5 For confirmation that this interpolation reflects Parfit’s view, note 
that just before this passage he writes: ‘As I have argued, what fun-
damentally matters are psychological connectedness and continuity’ 
(1984, p. 313). (For an explanation of continuity, read on.)
6 Parfit (1984), p. 313.
7 Parfit writes: ‘Besides direct memories, there are several other 
kinds of direct psychological connection. One such connection is that 
which holds between an intention and the later act with which this 
intention is carried out. Other such direct connections are those which 
hold when a belief, or a desire, or any other psychological feature, 
continues to be had’ (1984, pp. 205–206).
8 Parfit (1984), p.  206. He adds that we might need to weight the 
connections, for instance by their distinctiveness (ibid. 515 n. 6).
3 Hume (1978) [1739], III.ii.7; Pigou (1932), I.ii.3.
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Although strong connectedness is not transitive, continuity, 
which is just the transitive closure of strong connectedness, 
is transitive; and it holds between myself now and myself 
whenever I exist at all.
Connectedness and continuity are the two relations that 
make my future self of special concern to my present self. 
And although continuity does not come in degrees, con-
nectedness plainly does. Parfit’s argument is then that it can 
be rational to care less about (the well-being of) myself in 
the distant future than about myself in the nearer future, 
because time diminishes the degree of connectedness. There 
are fewer connections between me now and my distant-
future self than between me now and my near-future self. 
That is his normative justification of what I am calling pure 
time-preference.9
2  Rational Time‑Preference 
is Delay‑Consistent
This second section outlines a well-known constraint upon 
time preference that threatens to undermine Parfit’s argu-
ment. Section 3 realizes that threat: but in this section, I’ll 
just describe the idea and then illustrate it. I’ll do this briefly 
and informally, since the basic point is well-known (for 
details see Appendix 1).
The representative time-preferring agent (call her Alice) 
is willing to make trade-offs that a temporally neutral person 
(call him Bob) would decline. For instance, let T1 and T2 
be real numbers such that Alice presently cares more about 
her well-being T1 units of time (say, days) from now than 
after T2 units of time from now. (In the cases that will mat-
ter T1 < T2, but we needn’t assume this here.) Then Alice 
currently prefers waiting T1 days for one additional unit of 
well-being to waiting T2 days for the same benefit. On a 
natural assumption,10 there is therefore some r < 1 such that 
she now prefers waiting T1 days for r units of well-being over 
waiting T2 days for 1 unit of well-being, and so would trade 
in the second for the first; whereas Bob—who is indifferent 
between early and late well-being—does not have this pref-
erence for any r < 1, and so would never trade in the second 
for the first.
Focus now on the delay between T1 days in the future 
and T2 days in the future, which I’ll define simply as the 
ordered pair (T1, T2), where T2 > T1. The length of this delay 
is T2 − T1. Its discount value V (T1, T2)—relative to Alice—
is the r such that Alice is indifferent between r units of well-
being T1 days from now and one unit of well-being T2 days 
from now. (More-or-less equivalently, it is the smallest r 
such that Alice would accept the former in exchange for 
the latter.)
The key feature that arguably constrains rational time-
preference is then:
Delay-consistency (DC): Delays of the same length 
have the same discount value.
DC constrains the value of a delay to depend only on its 
duration and not on its futurity. For any T1 and T2, V (T1, T2) 
depends only on their difference T2 − T1 and not in any other 
way on the absolute values of T1 and T2. If Alice conforms 
to DC then she must, for instance, value a week’s delay in a 
week’s time—that is, (7, 14)—at the same rate as a week’s 
delay in 3 weeks’ time, i.e. (21, 28). If Alice violates DC 
then I’ll say that she is delay-inconsistent.
DC places the following constraint on the trade-offs that 
Alice is (now) willing to make. Suppose Alice is willing to 
exchange 1 unit of well-being to be realized 4 weeks from 
now, for r units of well-being to be realized 3 weeks from 
now; then she is willing to exchange one unit of well-being 
to be realized 2 weeks from now, for r units of well-being 
to be realized 1 week from now. More generally, if: (a) she 
is willing to exchange N units of well-being to be realized 
after T2 for rN units to be realized after T1; then: (b) she is 
willing to exchange N units of well-being to be realized after 
T2 + t for rN units to be realized after T1 + t, for any t such 
that T1 + t and T2 + t are both positive.
Now suppose that at any time Alice takes the same atti-
tude towards well-being at the same distance in the future: 
if e.g. on 1 January she is indifferent between 1 additional 
unit of well-being on 1 January and x additional units on 
16 January, then on 12 January she is indifferent between 1 
additional unit on 12 January and x additional units on 27 
January. This assumption is formally reflected in the fact 
that the discount value function V is a function only of a 
temporal interval measured from the present; it is not also 
sensitive to which time is now present. The usual name for 
this is stationarity.11
Stationarity (S): Alice is equally patient at all times.
It is important not to confuse stationarity with delay-con-
sistency. DC is a synchronic constraint: it says that evaluated 
at any fixed time t = 0, delaying a consumption from a future 
9 It does not justify what one might call dogmatic time-preference: 
that is, diminished concern for one’s more distant future self just 
because it is more distant in time. Rather it identifies something other 
than the date whose diminution between now and that date rational-
izes a diminution of concern. Parfit writes that the quoted argument 
‘defends a new kind of discount rate. This is a discount rate, not with 
respect to time itself, but with respect to the weakening of one of the 
two relations which are what fundamentally matter [i.e. connected-
ness and continuity]’ (1984, p. 314).
10 Specifically, we assume that her present value for waiting T1 days 
for rN units is continuous in r. 11 Farmer and Geanokoplos (2009), p. 2.
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time t = t1 to the future time t2 devalues the consumption by a 
factor that depends only on the length of the delay t2 − t1 and 
not also on its timing i.e. not in any further way on the abso-
lute value of t1. S is diachronic: it says that when evaluated 
at different times a delay of fixed length and fixed distance 
from the index of evaluation creates the same discounting 
of value.
The main point of this section is that if Alice violates DC 
but satisfies S then she is exploitable. Given a suitable com-
bination of offers she will voluntarily make a sequence of 
choices that not only reduces her aggregate well-being over 
time but strictly reduces it at some time without increasing 
it at any time.12
For an unrealistically dramatic illustration, suppose that 
Alice’s delay-inconsistency takes the following form: the 
discount value of a delay of length 1 day is 0.2 if the delay 
begins 1 day in the future, but 0.8 if the delay is 2 days in 
the future. Stationarity implies that she retains this pattern of 
preference over the next week; so for any N we have:
(1) On Monday she is indifferent between N units (of well-
being) on Thursday and 0.8N units on Wednesday.
(2) On Tuesday she is indifferent between N units on 
Thursday and 0.2N units on Wednesday.
Now suppose that on Monday her well-being schedule for 
the future is as follows:
(3) 60 units on Wednesday, 60 units on Thursday.
On Monday we offer her (A) the chance to give up 20 of 
the Wednesday units for 30 additional units on Thursday. 
(1) implies that she will accept; so by Monday evening she 
is facing the schedule:
(4) 40 units on Wednesday, 90 units on Thursday.
On Tuesday we then offer her (B) the chance to give up 
40 units on Thursday in exchange for 10 additional units on 
Wednesday. (2) implies that she accepts this offer too. So by 
the time she gets to Wednesday she is facing the following 
schedule:
(5) 50 units on Wednesday, 50 units on Thursday.
Comparing (5) to (3), we see that Alice’s own prefer-
ences have led her voluntarily to accept trades that make 
her worse off on some days and better off on none. In this 
sense those preferences are inefficient. The culprit is delay-
inconsistency: given S (stationarity), she is open to this form 
of exploitation if and only if she is delay-inconsistent. To get 
a feel for this, notice that Bob—whose complete temporal 
neutrality plainly implies delay-consistency—would accept 
A but reject B.13
Does this show that delay-inconsistency is irrational? 
Well, it gives a reason to call it that; and it certainly is inef-
ficient. In any case, delay-inconsistent time-preference is in 
some sense self-frustrating: Alice is cheating herself out of 
something that matters to her, namely her own future well-
being. The next step is to redirect this concern at Parfit’s 
argument for time-preference.
3  Parfitian Time‑Preference 
is Delay‑Inconsistent
Parfit does not go into detail on the relation between (a) the 
diminution of connectedness between Alice now and her 
future self and (b) the rate at which she discounts the latter. 
But there are two obvious and natural ways in which (b) 
might seem to depend on (a). I’ll argue that on both, Parfitian 
time-preference is delay-inconsistent and so arguably irra-
tional. A third proposal does not entail delay-inconsistency; 
but it cannot support the form of time-preference that Parfit 
is seeking to justify.
Throughout this section I’ll work with a very simple 
model of diachronic connection. Say that a direct connec-
tion decays when the trace of Alice’s present psychology 
that preserves it is extinguished. For instance, if Alice sees 
a red car on Monday morning, then there is a direct con-
nection, sustained by her memory of that episode, that lasts 
until she forgets it: the extinction of her memory-trace is 
the decay of that connection. Similarly, the survival of any 
one of Alice’s present character traits constitutes a direct 
connection between her present self and any future version 
of her that retains it; when the character trait changes, the 
connection decays.
The model that I’ll use treats the longevity of any particu-
lar direct connection as a random variable. Random in what 
way? Well, a simple-minded idea would be to treat the decay 
of any one connection as a kind of rare event that is as likely 
13 For the proof of the general claim see Appendix 1. It is worth not-
ing that foresight makes no difference: it can easily be shown that 
even if Alice can see what choices are coming, she will still accept 
both choices. For an example of how this sort of exploitation might 
work in practice, consider the fact that many people pay for annual 
gym memberships that they then underutilize (Della Vigna and Mal-
mendier 2006, though note that the authors of that paper suggest 
overconfidence about future performance as a possible explanation. I 
thank Fabio Paglieri.).
12 The examples given here modify that in Mulligan (1996). The 
basic underlying point, that non-exponential discounting is dynami-
cally inconsistent, is due to Strotz (1955).
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to occur at any one time as at any other. We can express that 
with the following assumption:
Uniformity (U): If a connection has survived up to t, 
the probability that it will decay over the next small 
interval of time is proportional to the length of that 
interval.
Slightly more formally, this means that each direct con-
nection decays in the next ΔT  units of time with probability 
rΔT for some constant r, called the intensity of its decay-pro-
cess. It follows that the longevity of that connection follows 
an exponential distribution: if it exists now, then the prob-
ability that it will exist—i.e. will not have decayed—after a 
lapse of T units of time is e−rT . Similar assumptions are often 
used to model temporal intervals between randomly occur-
ring events like births or deaths in a population, arrivals at a 
queue or calls coming into a telephone exchange.14
It is important to bear in mind that U is not saying that 
different connections have the same probability of decay 
over any given time-period. The intensity associated with 
a memory connection might, for instance, be higher than 
that associated with a character trait. U implies only that 
the survival of each connection is a process with some fixed 
intensity.
It will matter to the argument that different connections 
do decay at different rates. Whether this is true of any actual 
individual is an empirical matter that I can’t settle here. But 
it is plausible enough: nobody would find it strange that 
vivid memories or strong hopes and fears last longer than, 
or that certain character traits or intellectual capacities 
change less frequently than, memories of everyday percep-
tual experiences. Setting aside the empirical plausibility of 
U, it would in any case be a serious qualification of Parfit’s 
argument that it only supports efficient time-preference for 
beings whose psychological connections all decay at one 
identical rate.
With U in hand I turn to the argument that Parfitian time-
preference violates DC; as advertised I derive it from two 
natural proposals about the relation between the diminution 
of connectedness and that of future-directed self-concern.
3.1  Connectedness Without Continuity
The simplest proposal is what Parfit’s wording most strongly 
suggests. Let Conn (T) be the proportion of Alice’s present 
states that are directly connected to herself T days in the 
future. Then her present discount value for the delay (T1, 
T2) is simply:
(6) V
(
T1, T2
)
=
Conn (T2)
Conn (T1)
I’ll say that in this case Alice simply discounts her future 
well-being.
For instance, suppose that on some appropriate measure, 
50% of Alice’s current mental states are directly connected 
with herself after a year (T1), but only 10% of her current 
mental states are directly connected with herself after 5 years 
(T2).15 If Alice discounts simply, her present value for the 
delay (T1, T2) is 0.1/0.5 = 0.2. She now considers one unit 
of well-being in 5 years’ time to be worth 0.2 units of well-
being in 1 year, and so would trade anything less than the 
former for anything more than the latter.
Does simple discounting give rise to delay-inconsistency? 
The following analogy sets out the intuition behind my argu-
ment that it does.
Let S be a composite material body consisting initially of 
N atoms of polonium-212, which decays very quickly, and 
N atoms of uranium-235, which decays very slowly. At the 
outset, the decay of polonium atoms makes a big difference 
to the proportion of original atoms of S that remain. But as 
time goes on the slow-decaying uranium atoms will domi-
nate: their decay will make an increasing contribution to the 
rate at which the survival-rate of the original atoms declines. 
And since uranium decays slowly, the proportion of original 
atoms that remains falls more slowly as time goes on. So this 
proportion will fall by more over any 1-day stretch in the 
near future than over any 1-day stretch in the distant future. 
The decline in the proportion of original atoms over a delay 
of fixed length is not itself constant but depends on how far 
in the future the delay is supposed to be.16
Back now to Parfit. The decay of a single atom of S cor-
responds to the breaking at some time t of one direct con-
nection between Alice’s current mental state and her men-
tal state at (or after) t. For instance, her losing a memory 
14 Proof: let ST be the proposition that decay does not occur before 
T units of time have elapsed, and let F(T) be the probability of 
ST . Then 1 − rΔT = Pr
(
ST+ΔT |ST
)
= F(T + ΔT)∕F(T) . So F(T + ΔT)−
F(T) = −rΔTF(T). Letting ΔT → 0 we have dF = −rFdT; so F(T) = e−rT .
15 The measure might involve some weighting of the states, so that 
the preservation e.g. of certain memory traces makes less of a contri-
bution than does the preservation of certain character traits. The exact 
details of the weighting won’t matter here.
16 Formally, let h1 be the half-life of polonium-212 and let h2 be the 
half-life of uranium-235. Then after time t the proportion of original 
atoms remaining in S is f (t) = def.e−r1 t + e−r2 t , where r1 = ln 2∕h1and 
r2 = ln 2∕h2 . So if an interval of time begins at time t and has dura-
tion x, then the ratio, of the proportion of original atoms at the end 
of the interval, to the proportion of original atoms at the beginning 
of the interval, is given by: V(t, t + x) = f (t + x)∕f (t) . This function 
is delay-inconsistent in the relevant sense if V varies with t as x > 0 
is held fixed, which is true if 휕V∕휕t ≠ 0 . Tedious manipulation shows 
that 𝜕V∕𝜕t > 0 iff (r1 − r2) e−r1x > (r1 − r2) e−r2x ; this condition holds 
for any x iff r1 ≠ r2 i.e. iff the isotopes decay at different rates.
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tomorrow constitutes the breaking of a direct connection 
between herself now and herself tomorrow (and thereafter). 
Now suppose that over some stretch of time direct connec-
tions with her original state break at random in accordance 
with U. But there are two types of connection: those that 
break frequently, and those that break infrequently. The 
foregoing argument shows that the proportion of direct 
connections that she maintains with her current state falls 
at a declining rate as time passes. So if the discount value 
she attaches to a delay (T1, T2) is the ratio of the weight 
of her present direct connections with Alice-after-T1 to the 
weight of her present direct connections to Alice-after-T2, 
this value will not remain fixed for delays of fixed length but 
will increase as the futurity of the delay increases. Alice is 
therefore delay-inconsistent.
Here is a simple if unrealistically stark illustration. Sup-
pose that Alice’s current mental ‘bundle’ consists of two 
types of state: memories and character traits, with weights 
W1 and W2 respectively. The preservation of a single char-
acter trait or of a single memory between now and some 
future time t constitutes the existence of a single direct con-
nection between herself now and herself at t; the loss of such 
an item between now and then constitutes the breaking of 
one such item. Now suppose that both types of connection 
decay at random, but memories quickly and character traits 
slowly. For instance, suppose that over an average 1-day 
period 50% of memory connections and 20% of character 
traits are lost.17
What the foregoing argument shows is that if she is a 
simple discounter then Alice’s current discount value for 
a delay of 1 day will depend on when that delay occurs: it 
increases with the increasing futurity of the delay. That is, 
Alice is at any time more impatient about delays that occur 
in the near future than she is about delays that occur in the 
relatively distant future. Formally, her discount value for 
a delay (T1, T2)—that is, the units of well-being at T1 that 
she would exchange for an extra unit at T2—is given by the 
following formula:
(7) V
(
T1, T2
)
=
W1 0.5
T2+W2 0.8
T2
W1 0.5
T1+W2 0.8
T1
So if e.g. W1 = W2 = 0.5 then the discount value of a delay 
of 1 day is V (1, 2) = 0.68 if that delay occurs 1 day in the 
future; but if the delay occurs 2 days in the future then it 
is V (2, 3) = 0.72.18 So simple discounting makes Alice 
delay-inconsistent: and if she simply discounts at the same 
rate today and tomorrow then she is liable to exploitation.19
3.2  Continuity as an Additive Constraint
The target passage from Parfit mentions two relations with 
one’s future self that might matter to one’s present self: psy-
chological connectedness and psychological continuity. The 
last section assumed that degree of connectedness is the only 
determinant of the rate of self-interested future discounting. 
But what if continuity also matters?
Continuity as defined in Sect. 1 is, unlike connected-
ness, an all-or-nothing relation: any future person is fully 
continuous with Alice now or not at all continuous with 
Alice now. So continuity (or its absence) should make the 
same contribution to Alice’s evaluation of future well-being 
regardless of when in the future that well-being is supposed 
to be realized.
There are two very simple and obvious ways to incorpo-
rate continuity into the discount function. We might treat 
it either (i) as making a weighted contribution to Alice’s 
present value for future well-being, over and above that of 
connectedness, or (ii) as a necessary condition on Alice’s 
presently attaching any value at all to future well-being. I’ll 
discuss (i) in this section, and I discuss (ii) briefly at n. 22. 
(I am not claiming that (i) and (ii) are exhaustive; but they 
do exhaust the obvious and natural possibilities. If they don’t 
help then the Parfitian must find something that does.)
We can formalize (i) as follows. Let the variable C* be 
sensitive to whether the person who benefits from some epi-
sode of well-being at T is psychologically continuous with 
Alice now. If so then C* (T) = 1. If not then C* (T) = 0. For 
continuity to make a fixed additive contribution to her evalu-
ation of a delay in the realization of well-being is for there 
to exist some constant λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, satisfying:
(8) V
(
T1, T2
)
=
(1−휆)Conn (T2)+ 휆C∗(T2)
(1−휆)Conn (T1)+ 휆C∗(T1)
In something closer to English: Alice’s present value for 
a unit of future well-being at a future time is a weighted 
average of two things: first, the degree to which she is psy-
chologically connected with the recipient of that well-being; 
second, whether the recipient of that well-being is continu-
ous with her. The discount value of a future delay in the 
realization of well-being is again the ratio of the value of 
this weighted sum for the later time to its value for the earlier 
time. I’ll call this λ-discounting.
17 Of course these rates of decay are too fast to be realistic. And in 
the normal run of things we can expect these states to be replaced 
by others (as may also be true in the analogy involving radioactivity). 
These points make no difference to the argument.
18 Nothing hangs on the simplifying assumption that W1 = W2. As 
long as we set both parameters to non-zero values the outcome is the 
same. (For proof see Appendix 2.)
19 For an argument that reaches similar conclusions about very long-
term discount rates—for instance, in relation to the pricing of envi-
ronmental degradation—see Weitzman (1998).
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What motivates λ-discounting is the philosophical intui-
tion that the degree of connectedness with one’s present 
self cannot be the only factor of future self-interest. There 
might well be future persons who are to some degree psy-
chologically connected with Alice but not psychologically 
continuous with her; on the Parfitian view, these are differ-
ent persons.20 But it might matter to her whether she gets 
the well-being. That is, if well-being is distributed amongst 
a range of future people who are all equally strongly con-
nected to her now, she ought to attach additional value to 
the well-being of the one that is identical to her. λ meas-
ures that premium. Note that I am not endorsing this line 
of thought but only making room for it: what makes the 
room is that λ in (8) may be strictly positive, rather than zero 
as in simple discounting. (And λ = 1 represents the other 
extreme of temporal neutrality, at least as regards Alice’s 
descendants-by-continuity.)
In any case it is easy to see that λ-discounting creates 
delay-inconsistency for the same reasons as—and in wider 
circumstances than—simple discounting. The mathemati-
cal case is straightforward and set out in Appendix 2. Here 
I’ll briefly state the intuition: what established the declining 
rate of decay of the polonium-uranium composite described 
at Sect. 3.1 also establishes the declining rate of decay of a 
composite of uranium and polonium with some third, radio-
actively inert substance.
More explicitly: the preferences of any λ-discounter over 
schedules of well-being enjoyed by her future self are indis-
tinguishable from those of a simple discounter who gives 
weight λ to cross-temporal connections that never decay.21 
The argument that simple discounting is delay-inconsistent 
therefore applies here too. As Alice looks further into the 
future, she sees the decay of more connections. So her con-
cern for her more distantly future self rests more on its con-
tinuity, and less on its degree of connectedness, with her pre-
sent self. But since continuity with her present self perishes 
more slowly than these other connections (for as long as she 
lives), the decline of her future self-concern must deceler-
ate. So λ-discounting is delay-inconsistent. Specifically we 
should expect the λ-discounter to care less about a delay of 
fixed length, the further in the future that delay is. Again, 
this leads to exploitability.22
3.3  Expectation of Continuity
A third proposal deserves brief comment. This is the idea 
that Alice presently weights well-being T days from now by 
her present degree of confidence that her present self is con-
tinuous with the person who gets the well-being T days from 
now. Let Cr be the probability function representing Alice’s 
credence or confidence over a suitable algebra of proposi-
tions. Then on this proposal, her discount value for a delay is
(9) V
(
T1, T2
)
=
Cr [C∗(T2)= 1]
Cr [C∗(T1)= 1]
This function plausibly satisfies DC. To see why, note 
first that if T1 < T2 (and setting aside exotic cases), Alice-
now is continuous with Alice-at-T2 if and only if Alice-now 
is continuous with Alice-at-T1 and Alice-at-T1 is continuous 
with Alice-at-T2. It therefore follows from (9) and the defini-
tion of conditional probability that:
 (10) V
(
T1, T2
)
= Cr
[
C∗
(
T2
)
= 1|C∗(T1 = 1)
]
And the latter is equivalent to Alice’s present confidence 
that continuity holds between T2 and T1. This quantity plau-
sibly is a function of T2 − T1, or at any rate it is if we assume 
that (a) when a direct connection decays, it is replaced by 
another with the same likelihood of decay. In that case (10) 
is simply the complement of the probability that enough 
direct connections will be broken over a short enough subin-
terval of (T1, T2) as to violate continuity within that period. 
If the proportion of direct connections that decay at any 
given rate is constant, which it is if (a) holds, then this prob-
ability depends only on the duration of the interval (T1, T2) 
i.e. only on T2 − T1, and not on its futurity. So (10) represents 
an attitude towards the future that is delay-consistent.
The trouble with (10) is that continuity considerations 
alone cannot justify the form of time-preference that had 
been our target all along, namely positive time-preference 
under certainty. The aim was to justify Alice’s present dis-
counting of future goods relative to present goods when she 
knows that the former will be as valuable to her when she 
20 This follows from his assertion that the future people that will be 
you are exactly those that are psychologically continuous with your 
present stage at times when nobody else is (Parfit 1984, p. 263).
21 This is something of a simplification: nobody lives forever, so it 
may be that at some t there are future persons with whom Alice’s pre-
sent mental state is connected, but none of those persons are continu-
ous with Alice. But this makes no difference to the point, which could 
equally well be put like this: the λ-discounter is indistinguishable 
from someone who puts weight λ on a connection that is especially 
long-lived in comparison with other types of direct connection. This 
still makes λ-discounting delay-inconsistent.
22 λ-discounting treats continuity as a weighted addition to Alice’s 
present value for future well-being. We might alternatively think 
of continuity simply as a necessary condition on Alice’s attaching 
any value at all to future well-being; formally speaking, this means 
that C* enters multiplicatively into Alice’s value function, so that 
V
(
T1, T2
)
= C∗
(
T2
)
Conn
(
T2
)/
C∗
(
T1
)
Conn
(
T1
)
 . But this reduces 
to simple discounting for stretches of time over which continuity is 
maintained (and so on Parfit’s hypothesis, over all of Alice’s lifetime), 
and so the objections raised at Sect. 3.1 will apply here too.
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gets them as are the latter when she gets them (i.e., now).23 
On the Parfitian equation of personal identity with continu-
ity, this means that we are supposed to be justifying the 
discounting of goods received by a future Alice with which 
she knows that her present self is continuous.24 So from that 
perspective, the target is to justify positive time-preference 
even in the situation where Cr (C*(T) = 1) = 1, for all rel-
evant T. That form of time-preference is plainly inconsistent 
with (10); so, it cannot be justified by considerations that 
justify time-preference only for stretches of the future over 
which continuity with the present has a positive chance of 
being broken.25
3.4  Comments
That concludes my main argument. Simply put, it is this. 
Delay-inconsistency is plausibly irrational. Parfit’s rationali-
zation of temporal discounting implies delay-inconsistency. 
Therefore, Parfit’s rationalization of delay-discounting fails. 
The next section examines some objections to it; but first two 
comments on its scope.
First: the argument raises a problem for Parfit’s rationali-
zation on the basis that it makes the rate of future discount-
ing an aggregate of psychological variables that diminish 
at different rates: some fast, some slow. But nothing in the 
argument crucially depends on the fact that these variables 
characterize the objects rather than the subject of future-
directed concern.
We get an argument with that second effect if we sup-
pose that human decision-making aggregates the output of 
two separate decision-making modules, one (‘System 1’) 
being impatient and the other (‘System 2’) patient. This idea, 
nowadays called the two-systems hypothesis, has roots in 
Plato26 and probably further back, and it currently enjoys 
some empirical support.27 According to it, we can model a 
decision maker’s valuation of delays (i.e. the overall output) 
as reflecting a weighted average of two attitudes, namely 
the ‘impatient’ and ‘patient’ discounting functions associ-
ated with System 1 and System 2 respectively. If each indi-
vidual system conforms to delay-consistency, the aggregate 
output—the decision maker herself—will by the foregoing 
argument be delay-inconsistent.
The two-systems hypothesis therefore renders the deci-
sion-maker susceptible to exploitation by means of the pro-
cedure described in Sect. 2: when faced with an appropriate 
schedule the decision-maker will make choices that render 
her worse off by her own lights at all periods than she might 
have been had she chosen otherwise. (And—if it means any-
thing to say this—both of her sub-personal systems will also 
be ‘worse off by their own lights’ than each might have been 
had she chosen otherwise.) None of this means that aggrega-
tive models should be discarded as descriptive accounts—on 
the contrary, they enjoy some empirical support and may 
indeed explain our actual future-directed attitudes, which 
as is well-known do display delay-inconsistency.28 I men-
tion it merely to illustrate that as well as its present nor-
mative application the main argument also has descriptive 
application.
Second: the argument did not rely on the fact that in 
Parfit’s view the relevant cross-temporal connections are 
between mental bundles. They might connect any aggre-
gates some of whose elements decay or are replaced at dif-
ferent rates from others. So again, the argument would apply 
against anyone—if there is anyone—who tried to justify 
future discounting in terms of the diminution of some other 
aggregate of cross-temporal connections. (For instance: if 
some genetic lines have a greater chance of extinction than 
others, one could not justify an efficient social discount 
function on the basis that the value to present society of 
future welfare is the proportion of presently-living people 
who get, or whose descendants get, to enjoy it.29)
23 ‘But nobody is ever certain about her future survival.’ True 
enough, but pure positive discounting makes a difference even if we 
allow it. If her confidence that she will survive for at least T units is 
e.g. 50%, the pure positive discounter must value a reward at T at less 
than half of its present value to her. (9) Cannot account for this.
24 Strictly speaking Parfit does not equate personal identity with con-
tinuity but rather with unique continuity (see n. 20). But the equation 
holds good if as here we ignore exotic cases involving branching and 
fusion.
25 Note that on the assumption (a), we can also argue against ver-
sions of (i) 휆-discounting (Sect. 3.2) and (ii) multiplicative discount-
ing (n. 22) that replace continuity with expectation of continuity. 
More precisely, these theories suppose either (i) V
(
T
1
, T
2
)
= (1 − 휆)
Conn
(
T
2
)
+ 휆Cr(C∗
(
T
2
)
= 1)
/
(1 − 휆)Conn
(
T
1
)
+ 휆Cr(C∗
(
T
1
)
= 1) or (ii) 
V
(
T1, T2
)
= Conn
(
T2
)
Cr(C∗
(
T2
)
= 1)
/
Conn
(
T1
)
Cr(C∗
(
T1
)
= 1)  . 
Given (a), we have in general that Cr(C∗(T) = 1) = e−rT , r > 0 . Case 
(i) and case (ii) therefore both reduce to simple discounting and the 
argument in Sect. 3.1 apples.
26 Phaedrus 237d, e.
27 See e.g. McClure et al. (2007).
28 For evidence that human subjects are delay-inconsistent (i.e. 
through ‘hyperbolic discounting’), see e.g. Kirby and Herrnstein 
(1995).
29 It may be worth briefly mentioning one more general point that 
does follow from the considerations here. Consider reconciliation-
ism: that is, the view (defended in Lewis 1976) that survival is what 
matters about personal identity, and that psychological connectedness 
is what matters about it. It is plausible that reconciliationism is only 
viable in a form that implies (a) that one weights consumption of a 
future stage by one’s credence that it and the present stage belong to 
a single person and (b) that this weight matches the degree of psycho-
logical connectedness (as argued in Williams 2014). Clearly (a) and 
(b) make the position vulnerable to the concerns that this section has 
outlined.
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4  Objections
The following diagram represents the structure of my argu-
ment up to this point. In it, an AND gate represents the con-
junction of the claims pointing into it; a claim in a box is 
entailed by whatever points directly into it (Fig. 1).
As the diagram shows there are two premises that a 
defender of Parfit might reject. I’ll consider these in turn.
4.1  Rejecting S
Stationarity is crucial to the argument because a non-sta-
tionary discount function might be delay-inconsistent yet 
unexploitable.30 Such a discount function would therefore 
be immune to criticism from the standpoint of Sect. 3.
Generally, if Alice’s time-preference is positive then it 
suffices to avoid exploitation that the following holds: at 
any times t, t + Δ (Δ > 0), and for any delay (T1, T2) such 
that T1, T2 ≥ Δ, her valuations at t and t + Δ, namely Vt and 
Vt+Δ, satisfy:
 (11) Vt
(
T1, T2
)
= Vt+Δ
(
T1 − Δ, T2 − Δ
)
And although stationary discounting, if it satisfies (11), is 
delay-consistent and so non-Parfitian for the reasons stated 
at Sect. 3, Alice could still avoid exploitation if she were 
non-stationary. If she gets increasingly patient, she may not 
make the choices amongst future allocations of well-being 
that caused the trouble in Sect. 3. For instance, suppose that 
Alice’s attitude towards the future evolves as follows:
 (12) Vt
(
T1, T2
)
=
1+ t+ T1
1+ t+ T2
Vt is delay-inconsistent: it implies that at any time t, the 
cost of deferring the enjoyment of a future good by a fixed 
delay T2 − T1 is a declining function of the futurity of that 
delay. For instance, at t = 0, the cost of delaying the enjoy-
ment of a future good from tomorrow to the day after is 33% 
of the present value of having it tomorrow. But at the same 
time, the cost of delaying a future good from 8 to 9 days in 
the future is only 10% of the present value of having it in 
8 days.
But Vt is also unexploitable, since it satisfies (11). Infor-
mally, this is because Vt implies a secular increase in the 
agent’s patience that exactly balances the change in value of 
future goods as they become less and less future. In conse-
quence, the relative values of a smaller-sooner and a larger-
later reward remains constant as the time for the realiza-
tion of those rewards gets closer: hence the passage of time 
cannot by itself induce any reversal of preference. The step 
from delay-inconsistency to exploitability therefore fails in 
this case.
But non-stationarity is normatively unsatisfactory for rea-
sons that do not apply to Parfit’s original idea. For it makes 
Alice’s present evaluation of a future delay depend not only 
on the futurity and length of that delay but also on what 
date it is now. More specifically, her rate of time-preference 
at any time is a function of the date t—typically a declin-
ing function, so that the longer she lives the more patient 
she gets. But why should her past longevity have norma-
tive bearing on her present concern for her future self? Why 
should it be a demand of rationality that (for instance) Alice 
on 1 January 2016 cares less about her consumption on 10 
January than Alice on 1 June 2017 cares about her consump-
tion on 10 June 2017?
Besides, if we are in the business of rationalizing non-
stationarity, we must give up on Parfit’s original claim that 
the only things that are prudentially relevant to present dis-
counting are the continuity and the degree of connected-
ness between herself now and herself at later times. These 
quantities do not even appear in (12). It may be that both 
are the same as assessed at 1 January 2017 with respect to 
Fig. 1  Logical relations 
between key claims
Uniformity 
(U) 
Parfitian 
discounting 
Delay 
Inconsistency 
Stationarity 
(S) 
Exploitability 
30 This is a point that the literature on future discounting sometimes 
misses. For instance, Sozou (1998) argues that preference-reversal 
occurs if an agent stationed at T discounts any future time t by exactly 
his subjective probability, at T, of his survival up to T + t, where the 
event of his death is a decay process with unknown intensity λ. Sozou 
argues correctly that, given an exponential prior for λ, the agent starts 
out with a hyperbolic discount function. So it is true that the agent’s 
discount function violates delay-consistency. But it does not follow, 
as Sozou claims (p. 2017), that the agent exhibits preference-reversal, 
because the agent will violate stationarity: as time passes, his esti-
mate of λ will fall, so he becomes increasingly patient.
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10 January 2017 and at 1 June 2017 with respect to 10 June 
2017.31 Yet non-stationarity demands a more patient attitude 
at the later date.
So whilst dropping S stops the argument in Sect. 3 from 
going through, it is doubtful that doing so is either (a) a 
requirement of rationality or (b) consistent with Parfit’s 
approach.
4.2  Rejecting U
The second assumption was that Alice treats degree of con-
nectedness as the outcome of an aggregate of decay-pro-
cesses of known intensity, so that the expected number of 
direct connections that survive between herself now and her-
self after T is some weighted average of e−r1T , e−r2T ,… e−rnT , 
where r1,…rn are the known rates at which different kinds 
of connections decay. This assumption was crucial, for 
instance, in the illustrative derivation of the delay-incon-
sistent value function (7) from the assumption (6) that Alice 
simply discounts the future; more generally it is crucial for 
deriving the general result in Appendix 2.
Alternative assumptions about the decay of direct con-
nections do not have this effect. The simplest and most 
plausible alternative is that Alice is—like most people—
completely in the dark as to the rates of decay of differ-
ent kinds of connections, but she estimates that overall, the 
total number of connections, between her present self and 
herself after a lapse of T days, declines at an exponential 
rate i.e. Conn (T2)∕Conn (T1) = f (T2 − T1) for some expo-
nential function f. If the subject thinks about herself in this 
way, simple discounting seems to imply delay-consistency, 
contrary to the inference defended at Sect. 3.1. Moreover, it 
looks more plausible that subjects do think of themselves in 
this way. In real life nobody even considers, let alone knows, 
the probability that any given direct connection, or type of 
direct connection—say, an autobiographical memory—
will survive for a day, or a year. In short, the argument at 
Sect. 3.1—according to this objection—involves an absurd 
over-intellectualization of what goes on when a real person 
thinks about his or her future; and when we try to be even 
slightly more realistic, the whole argument collapses.
There are two replies. The first turns on the distinc-
tion—which admittedly I am taking for granted—between 
the descriptive and the normative. Of course nobody really 
thinks about these things in the course of actual decision-
making. But Parfit’s account was supposed to be norma-
tive—it was saying, not that considerations about direct 
connections do in fact enter into the future-directed and self-
interested deliberations of actual people, but that they ought 
to. But if the latter is true then it should hold not only for 
people who are ignorant of differentials in rates of psycho-
logical decay, but also for people who are not. If (a) Parfit’s 
normative standard bears on you and me then (b) it would 
also bear on people who differed from us only in respect of 
knowing the different average rates at which different types 
of psychological states decay. The objection does nothing to 
mitigate the doubt that my argument casts on (b); that doubt 
therefore transfers to (a).32
Second, it is not necessary for my argument that Alice’s 
knowledge of her cross-temporal psychological connections 
be as detailed as the objection envisages. If she knows sim-
ply that some cross-temporal direct connections—e.g. char-
acter traits—decay on average more slowly than others—e.g. 
quotidian autobiographical memories—then the argument 
already applies. She can see that the degree of connectedness 
between herself after T days and her present self will decline 
more slowly as T increases, because as T increases the more 
stable types of connection tend to make a dominant con-
tribution to the similarity between herself at T and herself 
now. That by itself is enough to make the Parfitian valuation 
of future well-being delay-inconsistent as argued at Sect. 3; 
given the further argument at Sect. 2 it follows in turn that 
such a valuation is exploitable and so plausibly irrational.
31 This hypothesis might seem in tension with the argument at 
Sect.  3, to the effect that the rate at which connections are lost is a 
declining function of time. But not so. Section 3 exploited the thought 
that (e.g.) if we look only at direct connections with Alice’s state on 
1 January 2017, the (expected) proportion of the connections among 
these that are lost between 1 January and 10 January 2017 exceeds 
the proportion of the connections among these that are lost between 1 
June 2017 and 10 June 2017. It is consistent with this to suppose that 
the proportion of direct connections with Alice’s state on 1 January 
2017 that are lost between 1 January 2017 and 10 January 2017 is the 
same as the proportion of connections with Alice’s state on 1 June 
2017 that are lost between 1 June 2017 and 10 June 2017.
32 A similar point applies to the objection that we ought not to model 
the survival of a direct connection as a uniform decay process, but 
rather as governed in some other way that could in principle sup-
port the delay-consistency of a Parfitian attitude to the future based 
on connectedness. For instance, if Alice expects certain severe kinds 
of psychological disruption to occur at certain specific times in the 
future then it would be wrong to suppose that e.g. simple Parfitian 
discounting as in (6) conforms to a rule like (7) over intervals in 
which those times fall. But if Parfit’s justification works at all then 
it should apply to stretches of the future when things are expected 
to go on roughly as normal i.e. in which Alice does not expect any 
such disruption (or at least, thinks it no more likely to occur at one 
rather than at another point in this era). Modelling connectedness as 
an aggregate of uniform decay processes is the natural approach to 
that situation, because that model distinctively captures the idea that 
each direct connection is as likely to decay in any one small interval 
of time as in any other of equal length.
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5  Conclusion
For any time t in the next 50 years (say), Alice like many 
other people now has a special concern for just one of the 
persons who will exist at that future time. It is correct to 
say that Alice is identical to the object of her special con-
cern at t. But leaving it at that gives us no idea why she 
should, as most of us do, care more about the well-being of 
that special object’s near future than about its more distant 
future. After all, identity does not come in degrees: she is 
no more identical to herself tomorrow than to herself in 
10 years.
The ingenuity of Parfit’s idea was that it identifies a rela-
tion—degree of connectedness—that comes in degrees, 
and seems to do so in just the right way to justify caring 
more about the near than about the distant future. Unfortu-
nately this promising idea cannot rationalize positive time 
preference: if the measure of connectedness aggregates 
connections that decay at different rates, then the Parfitian 
argument supports forms of time-preference that are plau-
sibly irrational because exploitable by means of familiar 
devices.
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Appendix 1: Delay‑Inconsistency 
and Exploitability
I claimed at Sect. 2 that any delay-inconsistent V  is exploit-
able. To see why, suppose that Alice is delay-inconsistent 
i.e. for some Δ , a > 0 , V  satisfies:
 (13) V
(
T1, T2
)
= aV
(
T1 + Δ, T2 + Δ
)
, Δ > 0, a ≠ 1
This means that she is just willing to exchange one unit 
of well-being in T2 days’ time for V (T1, T2) units in T1 days’ 
time; and she is just willing to exchange one unit of well-
being in T2 + Δ days’ time for (1/a)V (T1, T2) units in T1 + Δ 
days’ time. Let the date t1 + Δ be (now) T1 + Δ days in the 
future, and let the date t2 + Δ be T2 + Δ days in the future. 
And suppose that she is now looking forward to the follow-
ing schedule of future well-being:
 (14) 1 unit at t1 + Δ, 1 unit at t2 + Δ
Now suppose first a < 1. Then we offer to exchange the 
unit of well-being at t1 + Δ for an additional a
/
V
(
T1, T2
)
units at t2 + Δ. Her schedule now looks like this:
 (15) 0 units at t1 + Δ, 1 + a
/
V
(
T1, T2
)
 units at t2 + Δ
We now wait for Δ days i.e. until the remaining delay 
before the date t1 + Δ is T1 days. At that point she is (by 
S) willing to take V (T1, T2) units at t1 + Δ for each unit 
at t2 + Δ. So we choose 𝜀, 𝜀�, 𝜀�� > 0 s.t. a + 𝜀 + 𝜀� = 1 
and 휀�� = 휀
/
V
(
T1, T2
)
 (these are guaranteed to exist since 
a < 1) and offer her a + 휀 units at t1 + Δ in exchange for 
a + 휀
/
V
(
T1, T2
)
 units at t2 + Δ. She will accept this deal 
too, for a final schedule that looks like this
 (16) 1 − 휀� units at t1 + Δ, 1 − 휀�� units at t2 + Δ
Comparing (16) with (14) we see that Alice has signed 
up to a sequence of deals that makes her strictly worse off at 
both t1 + Δ and t2 + Δ and no better off at any other time by 
her own lights at any time. That is, at any time she strictly 
prefers (14) to (16) and yet she voluntarily moves from the 
former to the latter.
If a > 1 we can run a similar procedure in reverse: 
starting with (14), we offer to exchange the unit at 
t2 + Δ for an additional V
(
T1, T2
)/
a units at t1 + Δ. 
Then after waiting until Δ days have elapsed, we pick 
𝜀, 𝜀�, 𝜀�� > 0 s.t. 1∕a + 𝜀 + 𝜀� = 1 and 𝜀�� = 𝜀V
(
T1, T2
) ( these 
are guaranteed to exist since a > 1) and offer 1
a
+ 휀 units at 
t2 + Δ in exchange for (1∕a + 휀)V
(
T1, T2
)
 units at t1 + Δ. 
Again, Alice will accept both offers for a final schedule:
 (17) 1 − 휀�� units at t1 + Δ, 1 − 휀� units at t2 + Δ
This again represents an uncompensated loss that is unav-
ertable even if foreseen.
Appendix 2: Weighted λ‑Discounting 
and Delay‑Inconsistency
At Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 I claimed but did not prove that delay-
inconsistency attends λ-discounting regardless of how one 
assigns (non-zero) weights to continuity or to types of psy-
chological connections that decay at different rates, if each 
connection satisfies U.
Here is the proof. Formally, the statement to be proved is:
 (18) Suppose that λ1,…λn are all non-zero and that 
∑n
i=1
휆i = 1. 
Let V
�
T1, T2
�
=
∑n
i=1
휆ie
−riT2
�∑n
i=1
휆ie
−riT1 where ri ≥ 
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0 for all i, j and ri ≠ rj for some i, j. Then V is delay-
inconsistent.
The case that ri > 0 for all i corresponds to weighted 
simple discounting. The case that ri = 0 for some i corre-
sponds to the requirement that the agent gives some weight 
to continuity independently of connectedness.33 (18) covers 
both cases.
The proof is as follows. Write f (x) = ∑n
i=1
휆i e
−rix so that 
for any x, d > 0, V(x, x + d) = f (x + d)∕ f (x) . Then
 (19) 휕
휕x
V(x, x + d) =
f (x) f �(x+d) − f �(x) f (x+d)
f (x)2
Expanding the numerator of (19) gives:
 (20) 
n∑
i=1
휆irie
−rix
n∑
i=1
휆ie
−ri(x+d) −
n∑
i=1
휆ie
−rix
n∑
i=1
휆irie
−ri(x+d)
And with a little manipulation we can see that (20) is 
identical to:
 (21) ∑
i≠j
휆i휆je
−rix−rjx
�
rie
−rjd − rje
−rjd
�
This is easily seen to be the same as (22), which is in turn 
identical to (23) and hence also (24):
 (22) 1
2
∑
i≠j
휆i휆je
−rix−rjx
�
rie
−rjd + rje
−rid − rie
−rid − rje
−rjd
�
 (23) 1
2
∑
i≠j
휆i휆je
−rix−rjx
�
ri − rj
��
e−rjd − e−rid
�
But 
(
ri − rj
)(
e−rjd − e−rid
)
 is always non-negative; it is 
positive if ri ≠ rj. It follows that every summand in (23) is 
non-negative and that (23) itself is positive if any two con-
nections decay at different rates. (20) Is therefore also posi-
tive in these circumstances; so too, then, is 휕∕휕x V(x, x + d) 
(since the denominator on the right of (19) is certainly pos-
itive). So if Alice is a λ-discounter of any type then she 
attaches greater discount value to a delay of fixed length the 
further it is in the future. So she is delay inconsistent on any 
weighting of the connections whose preservation contributes 
towards her present concern for her future self.34
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Footnote 34 (continued)
